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Abstract 
This paper asks: what determines international migration and how has the EU’s free movement 
of people arrangement impacted this process? I argue that relative factor endowments (of capital 
and labor) and democracy serve as substitutes when a potential migrant is seeking a receiving 
country. By contrast, I argue that under the EU’s free movement of people regime, intra-EU 
migration is driven by relative factor endowments. Empirical analysis supports these arguments, 
and finds that relative factor endowments can compensate for a dearth in democratic governance 
in the receiving country and that relative factor endowments drive migration within the EU’s free 
movement of people regime.  
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In 2004 and 2007, following several years – and in some cases a decade – of planning and 
negotiations, the European Union (EU) welcomed twelve new member states. Having met the 
Copenhagen Criteria, these Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) became a part of 
the world’s most integrated regional trade agreement. With membership, these states received 
open access to Western European markets. Citizens of these new member states were from that 
point forward privy to the four freedoms enshrined in the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. 
Membership for these countries, however, came with a caveat: the free movement of people from 
the new member states to the existing member states would be restricted for a period of up to 
seven years following accession. While some member states, including the United Kingdom, 
chose to waive this caveat, most were relieved that their markets would not immediately be 
flooded with “Polish plumbers.” While there was much a priori speculation on the propensity of 
new member states’ citizens to migrate to Western Europe, there was little empirical evidence to 
show that this fear was warranted. 
What determines international migration and how have open borders impacted this 
process? As was demonstrated in the illustrative example above, the relationship between these 
questions cannot be understated. Assumptions regarding how international migration works 
clearly shape public opinion and public policy on immigration, including policies to allow 
unfettered migration, even if restricted to a limited set of sending countries. Problematically, 
these important questions have received inadequate scholarly attention. In this paper, I seek to 
redress this lacuna by offering a generalizable theory of international migration and empirically 
demonstrate the impact – if any – of the abnegation of immigration controls on migration. 
Surprisingly little ink has been spilled on the cross-national determinants of migration. 
Indeed, the majority of extant literature treats migration as an independent variable by focusing 
	   2	  
on the impact of migration on the sending and receiving states (Bearce and Laks 2010; Leblang 
2010; Weiner 2004). Of the papers that do treat migration as a dependent variable, none provides 
a satisfactory understanding of migration patterns (Leblang, Fitzgerald, and Teets 2009). The 
most developed body of literature that treats migration as a dependent variable comes out of the 
human security literature and argues that environmental degradation in sub-Saharan Africa 
drives individuals across borders in order to seek scarce resources (Weiner 2004). After positing 
the determinants of migration, these authors argue that migration leads to conflict among groups 
competing for these scarce resources. This argument is clearly inadequate in offering a 
generalizable theory of migration. The second argument that treats migration as a dependent 
variable comes out of the political economy literature and uses social network analysis to argue 
that existing migrant communities decrease information costs associated with migration for 
individuals coming from their home country (Leblang, Fitzgerald, and Teets 2009). While I will 
address this argument more thoroughly in a later section of this paper, it is problematic because 
the causal factors attributed to the social network are more likely a result of democratic 
governance and, as such, their argument obscures democracy as a significant factor in this 
process.  
Aside from being heretofore unanswered, there are multiple reasons why these questions 
ought to be answered. The rise of the radical right and the proliferation of anti-immigration 
platforms in many Western democracies demonstrate the increased salience of immigration 
issues for public policy. Yet without a clear understanding of the general determinants of 
migration, it is impossible to understand migrants’ motivations and to predict future patterns of 
migration. It is only through such understanding that we can mitigate the perceived economic 
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and social dislocation driven by migrants’ entry into foreign labor markets and the discontent 
driven by their entry into a state’s social fabric.   
Given the preceding concerns, the abnegation of immigration controls seems not only 
implausible, but also irresponsible. Yet scholars from the liberal tradition of normative theory 
argue forcefully for open borders by suggesting that given the liberal democratic conception of 
the moral equality of individuals, there are few justifications for prohibiting migrants from 
entering into society (Carens 1987; 1999; 2000). Carens (1987; 1999; 2000) suggests that while 
there are clear obligations for liberal democratic societies to enact relatively open border 
policies, if we believe in the moral equality of individuals, then liberal democratic governance is 
the only just form of government and, by extension, all governments ought to be democratic and 
promote predominantly open migration policies. While the veracity of these claims is outside of 
the scope of this paper, it is clear that the conclusions drawn are largely incompatible with the 
realities of the contemporary world. If we take these claims seriously, however, we must first 
understand the empirical impact of open borders through intensive study of the only current case 
of such policies – the European Union. The resultant scholarship will help us to ascertain 
whether ‘ought implies can’ by illuminating the volume and character of potential migrants and 
their probable impact on potential receiving societies. My goals for this paper are clearly more 
modest than the preceding statement implies: I seek to understand how and if migration flows 
vary under open borders relative to the status quo of restrictive immigration policies. It is my 
hope that future scholarship will build upon these findings in order to answer the further 
questions alluded to above. 
In this paper, I argue that relative factor endowments (of capital and labor) and 
democracy serve as substitutes when a potential migrant is seeking a receiving country. 
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Specifically, significant potential gains in democracy (capital-labor ratio) can compensate for 
insignificant potential gains in capital-labor ratio (democracy). More concretely, an individual 
can select a receiving state with a lower level of democracy (capital-labor ratio) than his or her 
home state, but still find migration beneficial by selecting a receiving country with a capital-
labor ratio (level of democracy) compared to his or her home state. Given the high levels of 
democracy within the EU, I posit that under the EU’s free movement of people regime the 
relative levels in the capital-labor ratio drives migration, regardless of the relative levels of 
democracy in the sending and receiving states. 
The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section, I outline my theoretical expectations 
for the general determinants and for the variations within the EU’s free movement of people 
regime. In both, I consider the role of demand-side motivations for migration, but posit that the 
difference between the two lies in 1) the presence or absence of supply-side restrictions to 
migration and 2) variations in the demand-side motivations driven by economic factors and 
governance structures. In the following section, I present empirical tests of the hypotheses that 
follow from my theoretical expectations. As a preview of my results, I find that there is indeed a 
conditional relationship between the factors driving the demand-side motivations for migration 
(relative factor endowments and democratic governance), and that in spite of the absence of the 
supply-side barriers to migration in the EU’s free movement of people regime, the same factors 
motivate migration between participating countries. The final section summarizes my argument 
and findings, highlights some of the implications of this study, and delineates some avenues for 
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Determinants of Migration  
 
Factor Endowments and Democracy: Substitutes, Not Complements 
 
In this section, I will outline the theoretical logic and causal mechanisms underpinning my 
argument that dyadic migration flow is the result of a conditional relationship between disparities 
in relative factor endowments and governance structure. Theoretically, this argument takes on a 
similar logic to that of diminishing marginal returns: having reached a certain level of democracy 
(capital-labor ratio), additional increases in the capital-labor ratio (democracy) will have less of a 
substantive impact on migration flows than would otherwise be expected. This argument is 
predicated upon the assertion that individuals seek to augment their well-being by increasing 
both their security and their wealth, and that migration is one method of attaining these ends. In 
this sense, the pursuit of security and wealth are the demand-side factors driving migration flows. 
In more formal terms, I expect a migrant’s utility to be a function of both security and potential 
wealth. To be clear, security and wealth may be attained in the migrant’s home state, and all else 
held equal, migrants would prefer to remain in their home country (Carens 1987). As will be 
made clear in the section on migration under an open border regime, I postulate that individuals 
from a sending state where security and wealth are relatively assured will migrate in order to 
maximize their wealth.  
Security and wealth are mutually reinforcing and inextricably linked, a proposition that is 
well documented in the psychology literature (Maslow 1943). Individual security is the 
prerequisite to wealth, as individuals cannot hope to attain above what they need if they are 
fighting for that which they need. Once security is attained, individuals are free to pursue wealth. 
Wealth, however, gives individuals an increased ability to ensure their own security; with 
increasing levels of disposable income individuals gain the ability to buy a safer home, hire 
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security personnel, or leave a volatile situation. Moreover, the security and wealth that motivates 
international migrants is extended to the family, and does not merely apply to the individual. 
Where an individual’s family does not migrate to the host state, he or she may, for example, be 
willing to accept horrific conditions in order to maximize his or her wealth so that he or she can 
send more money home to support his or her family. This dynamic, in part, explains why the 
interaction between democracy and the capital-labor ratio is important: migrants may be willing 
to accept a trade-off between security and wealth in order to ultimately maximize both.1 
Moreover, this suggests that migrants accepting wages as a substitute for democracy are more 
likely to leave their dependents at home and support them via remittances than they are to bring 
their family with them to a sub-optimal political situation.  
The economic portion of this argument relies on factoral models from the international 
trade literature, which are typically used to explain trade policy preference cleavages (Rogowski 
1987). My use of these models outside of both trade and cleavage formation requires brief 
justification. As outlined in the Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson theorems, the factoral 
model holds that owners of abundant factors of production will benefit from, and therefore 
desire, open markets. Given open markets, factors of production will move to where they are 
most efficient. This suggests that, at the individual level, laborers living in a labor-abundant state 
can expect to gain from open markets. In their domestic market, the price for labor (wages) is 
low relative to those in labor-scarce markets because the supply of labor is higher than the 
demand for labor. A laborer seeking to maximize his or her wealth, under this model, will move 
– sectorally, domestically, or internationally – to where labor is in higher demand, thus 
increasing the economic returns for his or her labor. Trade preference cleavages are therefore 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  This assumption makes no judgments as to whether migrants seek temporary or permanent homes, as the logic 
remains the same in either situation. 	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expected to form along factoral lines, with owners of abundant (scarce) factors of production in 
favor of (against) free trade. 
The factoral model is typically contrasted with the sectoral model, which holds that 
factors are immobile across sectors and that preference cleavages will form along sectoral lines 
(Frieden 1991). Specifically, this suggests that export-oriented sectors that will benefit from free 
trade will prefer open trade whereas import-competing sectors will prefer protection from 
markets. Hiscox, however, demonstrates that “broad class-based political coalitions are more 
likely where factor mobility is high, whereas narrow industry-based coalitions are more likely 
where mobility is low” (Hiscox 2001, 4). This suggests that it is possible to place factors along a 
spectrum with mobile and immobile serving as the ideal types on either end. Given the differing 
impact of relative factor mobility, it is important to consider the location of the phenomenon 
under study on the factor-mobility spectrum in order to ascertain the appropriate theoretical lens 
through which the phenomenon should be addressed. I contend that migration flows – but not 
labor in general – are governed by high factor mobility. That is, the subset of the population of 
labor in a given country that will find migration to be a viable option in obtaining security and 
wealth consists of those whose specific skill set is transferable either across industries or within 
industries in different locales.  
Additionally, while these theories address trade specifically, the underlying assumption 
of factor mobility renders these theories applicable to labor migration. Following Mundell 
(1957), I contend that trade and factor-mobility are substitutes: “Commodity movements are at 
least to some extent a substitute for factor movements” (Mundell 1957, 321). While the focus of 
Mundell’s article is on the impact of import tariffs on capital mobility, the proffered logic should 
theoretically extend to labor mobility. Moreover, evidence from the political behavior literature 
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provides strong support for immigration policy preference cleavages forming along factoral 
lines, suggesting that laborers perceive migration as detrimental regardless of sectoral affiliation 
(Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnett 2006). Finally, immigration 
policies typically follow the logic of reciprocity, as is common in international trade. Given the 
parallels between trade and migration and Mundell’s (1957) theoretical insights into the 
substitutability of factors and commodities, it is reasonable to extend these models to migration 
flows. 
The causal mechanism by which relative factor endowments drive migration relies on 
potential market gains. For owners of capital in a capital-abundant, labor-scarce economy, an 
increase in the labor market serves to increase their earnings by decreasing the supply, and 
therefore cost, of labor. For potential labor migrants from a capital-scarce, labor-abundant 
economy, migration to an economy with the opposite factor endowments increases his or her 
potential earnings because the cost of labor in the receiving country is high relative to that of the 
sending country. Through migration, both the laborer in the labor-abundant economy and the 
owner of capital in the capital-abundant economy can realize greater economic gains.2 
If labor could be treated as merely another economic factor, the first portion of this theory 
would be sufficient to explain migration flows. As described above, economic considerations 
certainly drive migration flows, but these are not the only factors impacting migration. As 
highlighted by Karl Polanyi, it is insufficient to treat labor as merely another factor endowment, 
divorced from social considerations. “Labor is only another name for a human activity which 
goes with life itself, which in its turn is not produced for sale but for entirely different reasons, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Taken to its extreme, migration could result in a reversal of a market’s relative factor endowments. This situation, 
however, is unlikely as the demand-side economic factors will change in such a way that migration no longer 
becomes preferable. 
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nor can that activity be detached from the rest of life, be stored or mobilized” (Polanyi [1944] 
2001, 75).  
Theoretically, democracy is a system of governance predicated upon the moral equality 
of individuals and the resultant obligation to grant individuals freedom; democratic institutions 
are merely instruments that are intended to obtain and ensure freedom and equality.3 Above 
providing individual security, which can be facilitated through wealth in spite of political 
conditions, democratic governance provides individuals with the freedom to pursue that which 
does not inhibit the freedom of others. Equality, in this sense, does not mean an economically 
egalitarian society. Instead, in the Lockean sense, it means that individuals have an equal right to 
freedom, and that freedom allows individuals to pursue wealth under the justified assumption 
that their security is reasonably assured (Locke [1764] 1980). In the pursuit of both security and 
wealth, a migrant can be reasonably assured of his or her natural right to the first and the 
freedom to pursue the second in a democratic country.  
The underlying argument of existing work on the determinants of international migration 
is congruent with my own: “just as migrants value destinations with maximal economic gains 
and minimal risks, they also make choices based on their assessment of political risks” (Leblang, 
Fitzgerald and Teets 2009, 6). Insofar as “economic gains” translates into wealth and “minimal 
risks” translates into security, these theories are mutually reinforcing. While the connection 
between “economic gains” and wealth is fairly obvious, the relationship between “minimal risks” 
and security requires elaboration. Leblang, Fitzgerald and Teets (2009) point to insights from 
social network analysis, which suggest that co-ethnic expatriot communities provide a form of 
social capital. Interaction with this group will minimize the migrant’s risks by “supply[ing] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Indeed, some scholars argue that there are additional instruments by which freedom and equality can be ensured. 
See for example Goodhart (2005). 
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information, minimiz[ing] uncertainty, reduce[ing] transaction costs and generally decreas[ing] 
the relative importance of traditional economic and social barriers to migration” (Leblang, 
Fitzgerald and Teets 2009, 6).  
What this analysis misses, however, is that democratic governance is a mechanism that 
facilitates social capital. Where the freedom of association is ensured, co-ethnic expatriots are 
free to associate and to learn from each other’s experiences, something that is not assured in non-
democratic countries. My conception of security clearly goes beyond the “minimal risks” 
envisioned by Leblang, Fitzgerald and Teets, but the freedoms that facilitate expatriot networks 
are certainly among the conditions that increase security. Moreover, migration is logically prior 
to co-ethnic expatriot communities. The mutual learning within these communities likely has an 
impact upon the pursuit of citizenship and naturalization, but is unlikely to account for initial 
decision to migrate.  
The mechanism by which these authors suggest that potential migrants assess “political 
risks” is inadequate insofar as it rests upon questionable logic that is predicated upon faulty 
assumptions: all else held equal, migrants will select a receiving state that has liberal 
naturalization laws because these migrants wish to secure citizenship in order to participate in the 
political process as a method by which to obtain the rights and protections equal to those of the 
citizens of the receiving state. First, this logic assumes that migrants desire citizenship. This is 
clearly not the case given the large number of immigrants eligible to apply for naturalization in 
the United States (an appropriate example given its relatively liberal naturalization policies) who 
choose to maintain permanent residence without pursuing naturalization. Naturalization is also 
logically impossible for individuals who do not wish to give up their current citizenship, but 
would be required to do so if naturalized in their receiving country. Second, this assumes that 
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citizenship is the only path to political participation. Even without the right to vote, immigrants 
may be able to influence the policy-making process through interest group participation (see 
Fordham and McKeown 2003 for the impact of non-geographic constituencies).  
Third, this argument assumes that citizenship is the only path to rights and protection. 
However, legal protection and liberties can be obtained by merely selecting a democratic state, 
which by design ensures freedom and equality. Finally, this logic assumes that migrants 
understand citizenship and naturalization laws. This is problematic in that there are costs 
associated with obtaining information on citizenship and naturalization laws. The complex nature 
of such laws accounts for the fact that there is a relative dearth of scholarship on immigration 
and naturalization regimes outside of legal scholarship.  
The preceding discussion yields the following testable hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: All else held equal, in dyads in which the receiving state has a high 
level of the capital-labor ratio relative to the sending state, increasing differences 
in the level of democratic governance will have a decreasing marginal impact on 
dyadic migration flows. 
Hypothesis 2: All else held equal, in dyads in which the receiving state has a high 
level of democracy relative to the sending state, increasing differences in the 
capital-labor ratio will have a decreasing marginal impact on dyadic migration 
flows. 
Open Borders, Factor Endowments, and Democracy: The Case of the European Union 
Given the theoretical expectations for the demand-side motivations for migration outlined in the 
previous section, there is little reason to expect the driving forces of migration to vary 
substantially under an open border arrangement, ceteris paribus. That is, the desire for well-
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being, derived through security and wealth, should be relatively normally distributed in 
populations across the globe.  In reality, however, migration controls constitute the supply-side 
of this phenomenon. While adequate data quantifying immigration control policies does not 
currently exist, comparative examination of the free movement of people regime within the 
European Union provides an effective method for comparing the determinants of migration flows 
in the presence and absence of migration controls. 
I do not, however, argue that the EU’s experience is generalizable. The European Union 
is a powerful bloc of developed countries within which democratic governance, high levels of 
wealth, and market-based economies are the norm. The barrier for entry to the Union, as outlined 
by the Copenhagen Criteria, is high. Prospective members must be functioning democracies, 
have market-economies, and protect human and minority rights, not to mention the ability to 
transpose in excess of 100 thousand pages of supranational law – the acquis communautaire – 
into national law. Given this, we should expect many of the demand-side factors in a cross-
national sample to be insignificant in a sample restricted to EU member states. The results of this 
analysis, however, are still instructive to a wider sample. First, if the theorized demand-side 
motivations for migration are correct and these motivations continues to drive migration within 
the EU, it is reasonable to expect that the abnegation of border controls beyond such a group of 
states will result in an increase in migrants. Second, given that the EU is the only contemporary 
instance of open borders – and is perhaps the only place where such an arrangement is currently 
politically viable – its experience provides important information for other groups of countries 
considering a similar regime.    
In light of the significant barriers to accession, it is surprising that many of the member 
states that had entered before 2004 (hereinafter EU15) were apprehensive about extending the 
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free movement of people regime to the fifth enlargement states. Moreover, historical experience 
suggests that concerns over a large influx of migrants following enlargement are unfounded 
(Goedings 1999). Prior to the second (Greece) and third (Portugal and Spain) enlargements, 
many of the same concerns were raised: that poor individuals from new democracies would flood 
the existing member states’ labor markets. These fears, however, never materialized and there 
was little reason to expect the realization of similar concerns following the fifth enlargement 
(Goedings 1999).  
In order to mitigate the concerns of the EU15, the accession treaties for the fifth 
enlargement states included a provision whereby EU15 member states could impose transitional 
migration restrictions for a period of up to seven years following accession. There is, however, 
significant variation in how this provision has been implemented. First, of the 2004 enlargement 
states,4 only Cyprus and Malta were entirely exempt from this provision and have been privy to 
the free movement of people regime throughout their membership. Second, there has been 
extreme variation in the restrictions imposed by EU15 member states on the eight remaining 
2004 enlargement states. Ireland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, for example, enacted some 
of the most liberal policies by immediately waiving restrictions for migrants from states 
participating in the 2004 round of the fifth enlargement. By contrast, France and Germany 
enacted some of the most restrictive policies for these migrants by choosing to maintain 
transitional agreements for seven years, the longest period allowed (European Commission 
2006). Third, there is variation in the restrictions imposed by individual EU15 member states on 
2004 and 20075 enlargement states. Finland, for example, enacted strong restrictions against the 
2004 enlargement states, but liberalized its policies for the 2007 enlargement states, whereas 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Cyprus, Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia 
5 Bulgaria and Romania	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Britain and Ireland waived restrictions for the 2004 enlargement, but imposed heavy restrictions 
for individuals from 2007 enlargement states (Drew and Sriskandarajah 2007). 
Despite the lack of supply-side constraints on migration among states participating in the 
EU’s free movement of people regime, there is little reason to expect the motivations of migrants 
to vary under this regime. That is, we should continue to expect migrants to be motivated by 
potential increases in their well-being through gains in security and wealth. When comparing the 
EU with the rest of the world, however, we should expect stark variation in the demand-side 
indicators. Specifically, given the relatively high levels of democracy and the capital-labor ratio 
in the EU, it is unproblematic to assume that security is reasonably well provided. Given the state 
of the demand-side indicators in the EU, I argue that potential gains in wealth drive migration 
flows. This discussion leads to the following testable hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: All else held equal, in dyads in which both states are participants in 
the EU’s free movement of people regime, the difference in the capital-labor ratio 
will have a positive and significant impact on migration flows. 
Data and Methods 
A Generalizable Model of Migration 
In this section, I present the results of OLS regression models with robust standard errors, 
clustered by directed-dyad. The model for hypotheses one and two presented above is as follows: 
Yit=β0+β1CLRit+β2DEMit+B3CLR*DEMit+βControlsit+eit 
 
The unit of analysis for this model is directed-dyad year for the time period from 1988 to 2003. 
The dependent variable, migration flow, is operationalized as the inflow of foreign population by 
country of nationality, and data were collected from the Migration Policy Institute (Migration 
Policy Institute 2010). Unfortunately, there are only a limited number of receiving countries for 
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which comparable data were available and, within these receiving countries, there were some 
variations in which sending countries and years were reported. The receiving countries for which 
comparable data were available were: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. But, for example, Canada 
only reported the migration flow for its top-ten sending states. For other countries, specifically 
France, Russia, and Ireland, the criteria for which sending countries were reported is not made 
clear and there is no obvious pattern to which countries were reported. Variations in the sending 
states reported by receiving states are reported in Appendix A. Additionally, given variations in 
receiving country reporting patterns, not all years in the time-period covered are available for all 
receiving countries. Variations in the years reported by receiving states are reported in Appendix 
B. Finally, some of the independent variables were unavailable for particular observations. The 
dyads included in the individual model specifications are reported in Appendix C. These caveats 
are unfortunately indicative of the data issues that plague the quantitative resources for 
immigration research. It is important, therefore, that we continue to develop these data where 
possible and make clear the limitations of the data used in such studies. 
The primary independent variable is the interaction between the difference between the 
capital-labor ratio in the sending and receiving state and the difference in levels of democracy in 
the sending and receiving country. Following Friedrich (1982) and Brambor, Clark, and Golder 
(2006), it is inappropriate to interpret the constitutive terms of a multiplicative interaction term 
independently. As such, I will calculate linear combinations of estimators in order to determine 
the marginal impact of the difference in the capital-labor ratio (democracy) at varying levels of 
the difference in democracy (the capital-labor ratio). If my hypothesis is correct, the linear 
combinations of estimators should find that increasing differences in levels of democracy (the 
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capital-labor ratio) result in a decreasing marginal impact of increasing differences in the capital-
labor ratio (democracy). 
The capital-labor ratio is operationalized as the natural log of the difference in wages and 
salaries in the sending and receiving countries (in USD) (United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization 2006). I use the natural log as opposed to the pure value of the difference in wages 
and salaries because I hold that an increase in $1000, for example, at the lower end of the range 
for this variable has a greater impact on migration than the same increase at the higher end of this 
range. Additionally, wages and salaries captures the volume of capital that is returned to labor 
for the “use” of their factor endowments. I have operationalized democracy using the difference 
in the sending and receiving countries’ scores in the Polity dataset (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 
2008).  
I also include a series of control variables in order to account for rival hypotheses and 
other potentially significant variables. I control for the difference in the log of GDP (in USD) 
(United Nations Development Programme 2009) as well as the difference in population (in 
thousands) (United Nations Population Division 2008) between the sending and receiving states. 
I make no particular hypotheses regarding these variables, but given my reliance on factoral 
models, it is important to control for pure measures of population and capital to demonstrate the 
amount of variance driven by the factor ratios as opposed to the factors in and of themselves. 
That said, if variations in migration flows are driven by pure levels of a particular factor then we 
should expect to see a negative sign on Population Difference, indicating that labor moves to 
labor-scarce locales regardless of other factor endowments, and a positive sign on GDP 
Difference, indicating that labor moves to capital-abundant locales regardless of other factor 
endowments.  
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I include a dummy variable – EU Free Move – which I coded as a 1 for dyad-years in 
which both countries were participants in the EU’s free movement of people regime. If the 
abnegation of migration controls results in a significant increase in migration flows, there should 
be a positive coefficient on this variable. Additionally, the inclusion of this control accounts for 
the argument that, given my restricted sample of receiving countries, the results are being driven 
by the EU’s common market provisions. 
I include measures of distance and shared borders in order to account for the physical 
barriers to entry imposed by geography, and the costs associated with surmounting these barriers. 
I obtained data for both of these variables from replication data provided by Goldstein, Rivers 
and Tomz (2007). Distance is operationalized as the log of the distance (in kilometers) between 
the centers of the countries in the dyad.  If distance has a significant impact on migration flow, 
we should expect to find a negative coefficient, indicating that as the distance between two 
countries increases, the volume of migration decreases. Shared borders is a dummy variable 
operationalized as a 1 if the countries in a dyad share a border and 0 if they do not. If shared 
borders have an impact on migration, we should expect to find a positive coefficient, indicating 
that there is a higher level of migration between two countries with a shared border than between 
those without. 
In order to account for cultural explanations of migration, I control for a shared colonial 
heritage and a shared official language, both of which are operationalized as dummy variables in 
which a common language or colonial heritage is coded as 1. I obtained these data from the 
replication data provided by Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz (2007). The dummy for a shared 
colonial orbit is included to account for the preferential immigration policies that states often 
enact for their previous colonial territories. If these policies have a significant impact on 
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migration flows, we should find a positive coefficient for shared colonial heritage. The dummy 
variable for shared language is included in order to account for diversionary migration – that is 
migrants selecting a country with a shared language over another, perhaps rationally preferable 
receiving country, to facilitate assimilation and integration. 
I also control for the log of imports from the sending to the receiving country using the 
replication data provided by Goldstein, Rivers, and Tomz (2007).  This control accounts for 
dyadic migration that is driven by reciprocal trade. I include a dummy variable for battle site, 
which takes on a value of 1 if a battle was occurring in the sending state’s territory in a given 
year. The data for this variable was obtained from the PRIO dataset (Gleditsch et al 2002). I 
finally include dummy variables for the individual receiving countries in order to control for 
within-country factors not captured by the other variables. I exclude the United Kingdom as the 
reference category. Table 1 provides a summary of all variables entered into the general model. 
[Table 1 about here] 
The results of this model can be found in Table 2. As the independent variable of primary 
interest is the interaction term, I run two sets of linear combinations of estimators to determine 
the marginal impact of the difference in levels of democracy (wages and salaries) on migration 
flow at varying levels of the difference in wages and salaries (democracy). The results of these 
estimators are displayed graphically in Figures 1 and 2, and were generated using the code 
created and provided by Brambor, Clark and Golder  (2006).  Figure 1 demonstrates the marginal 
effect of the difference in democracy on migration flow at varying levels of wages and salaries. 
The most important feature of this graph is the trajectory and significance of the line, which 
demonstrates that as the difference in wages and salaries increases, the marginal effect of the 
difference in Polity scores decreases for most values of the difference in wages and salaries. 
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More concretely, as disparities in wages and salaries increase, increasing disparities in levels of 
democracy have a decreasing marginal impact on migration flows. Substantively, when the 
difference in wages and salaries is set at its minimum value – -3.584 (e.g. the sending states 
wages and salaries measure is $525 million higher than that of the receiving state), a one-point 
increase in the difference between the polity scores of the sending and receiving state results in 
an average of 2433.07 additional migrants. When wages and salaries is set at its mean value of 
2.432 (receiving $62 million higher than sending), a one-point increase in the difference between 
the polity scores results in an average of 44.839 additional migrants. When wages and salaries is 
set at its maximum value of 12.329 (receiving 2.86 million higher than sending), a one-point 
increase in the difference between the polity scores results in an average of 2815.274 fewer 
migrants. This provides strong evidence for my first hypothesis: where there are greater potential 
monetary gains to be had by migrating, the potential gains in democratic governance have less of 
an impact on migration, ceteris paribus. This suggests that democratic governance can be 
substituted for by wages, and that higher potential wages and salaries can compensate for a lack 
of gains in democracy. 
[Table 2 about here] 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Given the evidence in figure two, however, it is unclear that the opposite relationship 
holds. If the marginal effects for the difference in wages and salaries were significant, it would 
suggest that higher potential gains in democracy could compensate for lower levels of potential 
wages and salaries. However, there are no values for the difference in democracy at which the 
marginal effect of wages and salaries is significantly different from zero. There are two possible 
explanations for this result, one theoretical and one empirical. Theoretically, this result may be 
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indicative of the qualitative difference in what wages and salaries, on the one hand, and 
democracy, on the other hand, can provide. While democracy can provide a reasonable level of 
individual security through the government, it cannot reasonably guarantee wealth – just the 
freedom to pursue wealth. Wealth, by contrast, can enhance security through the mechanisms 
described in the theoretical section above. This is anecdotally demonstrable, as individuals 
frequently accept positions in non-democratic countries in return for relatively high salaries; this 
dynamic that serves as the basis for Bearce and Laks’s (2010) work on the effects of migrants on 
democratic governance. Empirically, this result may be driven by the limited variation in the 
polity scores of the receiving countries.6 Until sufficient data becomes available we must reject 
the hypothesis that the impact of wages and salaries is conditional on levels of democracy. As 
was demonstrated in Figure 1, however, the corollary hypothesis – that the impact of democracy 
is conditional on levels of wages and salaries – is supported by the data. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
Some of the control variables attain significant results that should also be discussed here. 
Dyads in which both countries are members of the EU’s free movement of people regime receive 
55108.52 more migrants on average from the sending country to the receiving country than 
dyads in which only one or neither country participates in this regime. This result is unsurprising 
given the abnegation of supply-side restrictions on migration discussed in the theoretical section 
above. What is more surprising, however, is that the coefficient for distance is positive and 
significant. Substantively, this suggests that a one unit increase in the logged distance between 
two countries results in an average of 1938.885 additional migrants, ceteris paribus. This may be 
an artifact of the relatively low cost of modern transportation. Where an individual perceives a 
significant opportunity to increase his or her well-being, he or she may be willing to “invest” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Minimum of 9 and maximum of 10 
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more in travel in order to migrate to their preferred receiving country rather than his or her 
second or third preference, despite the higher costs associated with migrating to his or her first-
choice destination.  
The coefficient for shared language is positive and significant, suggesting that dyads that 
share a common language experience an average of 5670.999 more migrants than those that do 
not share a common language. Finally, several of the country dummies attain traditional levels of 
significance, suggesting that all else held equal, these countries receive migration flows 
significantly difference to those of the United Kingdom. I expect these differences to be driven 
by variations in immigration and immigrant policies, data for which are currently unavailable.  
Modeling Migration Under Open Borders 
In this section, I present the results of OLS regression models with robust standard errors, 
clustered by directed-dyad. The model for hypothesis three presented above is as follows: 
Yit=β0+β1CLRit+β2DEMit+βControlsit+eit 
 
As the variables are operationalized in the same manner as those for the generalizable 
theory of migration, I will not reiterate their operationalization here. One exception to this is the 
variable for EU Free Move, which becomes a selection variable as opposed to an independent 
variable. Additionally, the dummy variables for Canada, France, and Finland drop out of the 
analysis because Canada and Finland are not members of the EU, and there are no observations 
available in which France was the receiving country for individuals from other countries 
participating in the EU’s free movement of people regime.7 Summary statistics for the variables 
included in these models are reported in Table 3. 
[Table 3 about here] 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  As discussed above, there is significant variation in the reporting patterns for each receiving country. The list of 
which receiving states reported which sending states is reported in Appendix A.	  
	   22	  
In order to test this hypothesis, I report the results of two OLS regression models. The 
first model includes unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by 
directed-dyad. The second includes standardized (beta) coefficients with robust standard errors. 
While the model with the unstandardized coefficients facilitates substantive interpretation of the 
coefficients and between model comparisons with the general model of migration, the use of 
standardized coefficients allows us to understand which variables within the model have the 
greatest impact on migration flow. The results of these models are reported in Table 4. 
[Table 4 about here] 
In the first model, only the log of the difference in wages and salaries, the log of the 
difference in GDP, and the dummy variables for Finland and Germany as the receiving country 
attained traditional levels of significance. The variable of primary interest – the log of the 
difference in wages and salaries – was signed as expected. Substantively, a one-unit increase in 
the log of the difference of wages and salaries results in an average of 52380.98 additional 
migrants. The negative coefficient on the measure of GDP is perplexing: it suggests that a one-
unit increase in the logged difference in GDP results in an average of 46905.93 fewer migrants. 
However, as this result is obtained when holding wages and salaries constant, this suggests that 
higher levels of relative wealth that do not translate into wages and salaries serve to divert 
potential migrants to alternative receiving countries. 
Considering the second model in Table 4 allows us to see which factors have the 
strongest impact on migration flow. The variation in significance levels between the two models 
is a result of the inability to cluster the standard errors by directed-dyad. I am primarily 
interested in the more conservative levels of significance estimated in the first model and, as 
such, will focus my attention upon the variables that attained traditional levels of significance in 
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the first model. The standardized coefficient for the difference in wages and salaries 
demonstrates that this variable has the most substantive impact on migration flow, even in 
comparison to all of the variable that attained significance in the second model: a one standard 
deviation increase in the difference in wages and salaries (substantively, a $154 million increase 
in the difference in wages and salaries) results in an average of a 1.178 standard deviation 
increase in migration flow (110,439.809 additional migrants). The results for wages and salaries 
in these models provide support for my third hypothesis: ceteris paribus, the difference in the 
capital-labor ratio has the greatest impact on migration flow in dyads in which both countries are 
participants in the EU’s free movement of people regime. Interestingly and counterintuitively, 
the second greatest substantive impact is that of the difference in GDP, which is again negative.  
In order to demonstrate that the interaction effect does not have an impact on migration 
flows within the EU’s free movement of people regime, I re-introduce the interaction term into 
the model. The results of this model are presented in Table 5. As with the first model, I calculate 
linear combinations of estimators to determine the marginal impact of the difference in levels of 
the capital-labor ratio (democracy) on migration flow at varying levels of the difference in levels 
of democracy (the capital-labor ratio). The results are displayed graphically in Figures 3 and 4, 
and were generated using the code created and provided by Brambor, Clark and Golder  (2006).  
As the confidence intervals for both sets of marginal effects are not statistically significant, these 
figures provide additional evidence for my hypothesis that within the EU, migration is 
determined by potential gains in wealth. This is suggestive that in the absence of migration 
controls, immigration from sending states with a relatively high level of democracy to receiving 
states with a relatively high level of democracy will be driven by relative levels of wages and 
salaries. 
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[Table 5 about here] 
[Figure 3 about here] 
[Figure 4 about here] 
The evidence presented in this section has demonstrated two things. First, gains in wages 
and salaries can substitute for gains in democratic governance in determining migration flows, 
but gains in democratic governance cannot substitute for gains in wages and salaries. Second, 
given high levels of democracy, in the absence of migration controls wages and salaries are the 
strongest determinant of migration flows. 
Discussion 
In this paper, I have addressed two distinct but closely related questions: what determines 
international migration and how does the abnegation of migration controls impact this process? 
In terms of the first, I theorized that democracy and the capital-labor ratio served as substitutes, 
not complements, for immigrants. I found strong support a portion of this argument: a potential 
gain in wealth is a substitute for a potential gain in democratic governance. The corollary 
argument that democratic governance is a substitute for wealth did not find empirical support. In 
contrast with these results, in terms of the second question I argued that relative levels of the 
capital-labor ratio should have the greatest impact on migration within the European Union’s 
free movement of people regime, owing to the relatively high level of democracy that persists 
throughout the Union. This hypothesis found empirical support. 
There are several normative implications that ought to be addressed here. Perhaps the 
most obvious is the troubling empirical finding that wealth can substitute for democracy, but the 
reverse is not true. This is particularly troubling in light of Bearce and Laks’s (2010) finding that 
that higher levels of migration in resource-rich states (that typically have high capital-labor ratios 
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and low levels of democracy) leads to the so-called “resource curse.” According to their logic, 
migrants increase the returns to authoritarian governments by decreasing the price of labor to 
harvest natural resources. This increase in returns provides the government with greater 
resources to appease the selectorate, quelling the demand for democratization. Combining these 
results, we arrive at the problematic conclusion that individuals are not only willing to accept 
wages and salaries in place of democratic governance, but that under certain conditions, their 
presence can have a detrimental impact on the prospects for democratization in the receiving 
country.  
The second normative implication concerns the impact of unfettered migration on 
individuals in the receiving country. We must be cautious about Carens’s  (1987; 1999; 2000) 
calls for liberal democratic states to open their borders. As my findings suggesting that potential 
earnings have a greater impact on migration flows than democratic governance, we must 
consider the impact of the liberalization of immigration controls on individuals in the receiving 
country. Combining the logic of Dani Rodrik (1997) and Karl Polanyi ([1944] 2001), it is clear 
that if immigration controls are to be liberalized, this process must be managed in a deliberate 
and tempered manner. Rodrik argues that globalization has resulted in two reinforcing 
phenomena in the West: “the widening wage premium for skills” and “a significant increase in 
labor-market instability and insecurity,” both of which are driven by trade because trade impacts 
the demand and supply, and therefore price, of labor (Rodrik 1997, 11). Given Mundell’s (1957) 
insights into the substitutable nature of trade and factor mobility, it is again reasonable to expect 
unfettered migration – another hallmark of pure globalization8 – will result in similar patterns of 
social dislocation. Considering this in light of Polanyi’s ([1944] 2001) insights into the need for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Taking Suzanne Berger’s definition of globalization: “the emergence of a single world market for labor, capital, 
goods, and services” (Berger 2006, 9). 
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governments to manage the rate of change in order to mitigate social dislocation, it is likely that 
for Carens’s goal to be realized while meeting the needs of those already in the receiving 
country, open borders must be introduced slowly and deliberately. Perhaps even in the way it is 
being done in the European Union. 
 There are several avenues for future research that follow from this study. The single most 
important challenge facing students of immigration is the paucity of data. Very few data sources 
are available and, where they are, they are rarely comparable to other cases and are typically 
incomplete (cross-sectionally, temporally, or both). Immigration is an increasingly important 
policy area, but in order to effectively understand its determinants, scholars must devote 
considerable resources to bolstering both the quantitative and qualitative data available. 
Additionally, scholars should seek to understand the determinants of migration policy as well as 
the impact of migrants on the receiving country. These currently under-theorized phenomena are 
of great significance to receiving and sending countries and the individuals therein.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for the General Determinants of Migration 
Variable N Minimum Mean Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
Migration Flow 2672  1 12259.93 619060 47071.58 
Democracy 
Difference 
2672 -1 3.926 20 5.704 
Wages and Salaries 
Difference (log) 
2672  -3.584 2.4321 12.3297 2.8040 
Democracy 
Difference * Wages 
and Salaries 
Difference (log) 
2672  -5.317 17.507 173.543 31.229 




2672  -1.03e+09  -1.37e+07 8.23e+07 1.35e+08 
EU Free Movement 2672  0 0.198 1 0.399 
Distance (log) 2672  4.772 8.532 9.893 0.942 
Shared Border 2672  0 0.048 1 0.214  
Shared Language 2672  0 0.113 1 0.317 
Shared Colonial 
Heritage 




2672  11.513 15.236 23.561 2.443 
Battle Site 2672  0 0.149 1 0.356 
Austria 2672  0 
0.122 1 0.328 
Belgium 2672  0 0.021  1 0.145 
Canada 2672  0 0.021 1 0.145 
Finland 2672  0 0.064 1 0.245 
France 2672  0 0.009 1 0.092 
Germany 2672  0 0.262 1 0.439 
Ireland 2672  0 0.026 1 0.159 
Norway 2672  0 0.079 1 0.269 
Spain 2672  0 0.007 1 0.082 
Sweden 2672  0 0.289 1 0.454 
United Kingdom9 2672  0 0.099 1 0.299 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The United Kingdom is omitted from the empirical analysis as the reference category. 
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Table 2: General Determinants of International Migration 
Constant -22136.33* 
(13463.05) 
Democracy Difference 1250.958*** 
(1800.446) 




Democracy Difference * 










EU Free Movement 55108.52*** 
(13116.9) 
Distance (log) 1938.885** 
(885.438) 
Shared Border 1304.686 
(2534.294) 
Shared Language 5670.999* 
(3824.638) 
Shared Colonial Heritage -6773.388 
(8412.342) 





























Table reports unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by country in 
parentheses. 
Statistical significance: *<0.10, **<0.05 and ***<0.01 (one-tailed values) 
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Table 3: Summary Statistics for the Determinants of Migration within the EU’s Free Movement 
of People Regime 
Variable N Minimum Mean Maximum Standard 
Deviation 
Migration Flow 530 10 54666.66   619060 93751.96  
Democracy 
Difference 
530 0 0.053 1 0.224 
Wages and Salaries 
Difference (log) 
530 -3.329 0.373 4.271 2.109 
Democracy 
Difference * Wages 
and Salaries 
Difference (log) 
530 -2.203 -0.053 0.973 0.352 




530 4.772 1.32e+07  7.84e+07 5.10e+07 
Distance (log) 530 4.772 8.547 9.835 0.919 
Shared Border 530 0 0.047 1 0.212 
Shared Language 530 0 0.174 1 0.379 
Shared Colonial 
Heritage 




530 11.543 14.845 23.561 2.081 
Battle Site 530 0 0.011 1 0.106 
Austria 530 0 
0.102 1 0.303 
Belgium 530 0 0.038  1 0.191 
Finland 530 0 0.098 1 0.298 
Germany 530 0 0.406 1 0.492 
Ireland 530 0 0.132 1 0.339 
Spain 530 0 0.034 1 0.181 
Sweden 530 0 0.115 1 0.319  
United Kingdom10 530 0 0.076 1 0.264 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The United Kingdom is omitted from the empirical analysis as the reference category. 
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Table 4: The Determinants of Migration within the EU’s Free Movement of People Regime, 
without the conditional relationship between the difference in democracy and the difference in 






Constant 46672.47   
(87462.53) 
 




Wages and Salaries 
Difference (log) 






























Imports (from Sending to 
Receiving) 




































R2 0.524 0.5242 
N 530 530 
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The first column reports unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by 
country in parentheses. The second column reports standardized (beta) coefficients with robust 
standard errors. 
Statistical significance: *<0.10, **<0.05 and ***<0.01 (one-tailed values) 
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Table 5: The Determinants of Migration within the EU’s Free Movement of People Regime, with 




Democracy Difference -54495.6 
(46390.29) 




Democracy Difference * 










Distance (log) -2254.527 
(5224.392) 
Shared Border -4458.591 
(10660.03) 
Shared Language -8010.093 
(10769.78) 
Shared Colonial Heritage 53899.68 
(47212.38) 






















Table reports unstandardized coefficients with robust standard errors, clustered by country in 
parentheses. 
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Statistical significance: *<0.10, **<0.05 and ***<0.01 (one-tailed values) 
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Figure 1: Marginal Effect of the Difference in Polity on Migration Flow as the Difference in 
Wages and Salaries Changes 
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Figure 2: Marginal Effect of the Difference in Wages and Salaries on Migration Flow as the 
Difference in Polity Changes 
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Figure 3: Marginal Effect of the Difference in Polity on Migration Flow as the Difference in 
Wages and Salaries Changes, EU Sample 
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Figure 4: Marginal Effect of the Difference in Wages and Salaries on Migration Flow as the 
Difference in Polity Changes, EU Sample 
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Appendix C: Dyads Included in Final Models 
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